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The NSA: the impact of the wiretapping scandal 
on German-American relations 
Marta Zawilska-Florczuk, Kamil Frymark
Edward Snowden revealed that America’s National Security Agency (NSA) had tapped Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone and had collected date en masse. This has caused the 
largest crisis of confidence in relations between Germany and the US since the Iraq war. Due 
to the technological advantage which American intelligence services have, Germany wishes 
to continue close co-operation with the US but is making efforts to change the legal basis of 
this co-operation dating back to Cold War times. 
Berlin would like to secure part of provisions similar to the Five Eyes alliance – agreements signed 
between the US, the UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia in the second half of the 1940s, 
aimed at intelligence sharing and a ban mutual bugging. This could spell the end of the last 
(not including the military presence) relic of Germany’s dependence on the US which emerged 
following World War II and took shape in the shadow of the Cold War. The process of Germany’s 
emancipation in trans-Atlantic relations, which began after Germany’s reunification, would be 
complete. The US is however opposed to such far-reaching changes as it is interested in continued 
co-operation with Germany without limiting it. Were it not to sign agreements satisfactory for 
Berlin, this would lead to a protracted crisis of confidence in German-American relations. 
American security service surveillance 
in Germany
According to the information disclosed in June 
2013 by Edward Snowden, a former NSA em-
ployee, the US used the PRISM programme in 
order to run large-scale surveillance operations 
outside the country, including in the territory 
of the European Union. According to the Der 
Spiegel weekly, Germany were one of the coun-
tries most targeted, with the NSA intercepting 
approximately 500 million phone calls, e-mails 
and text messages at the turn of 2012 and 
20131. In July 2013 the German press revealed 
1 Compare: Der Spiegel, Geheimdokumente: NSA über-
wacht 500 Millionen Verbindungen in Deutschland, 
30 June 2013; http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpo-
litik /nsa-ueberwacht-500-millionen-verbindungen-in-
deutschland-a-908517.html 
that the US had also used PRISM in the ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan with the knowledge and 
consent of German intelligence and the Bunde-
swehr. Furthermore, information surfaced that 
the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the 
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitu-
tion (BfV) use the American spying programme 
XKeyscore, which gives the NSA the complete 
access to all data thus collected. On 24 October 
the news broke out that along with the surveil-
lance of German inhabitants the telephone of 
the German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder had 
been tapped since 2002. Later Angela Merkel 
received the same treatment. President Barack 
Obama claims that the US administration was 
unaware that this was happening. 
The scandal in connection with the NSA opera-
tions in Germany developed in two stages. Dur-
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ing the first stage between June and September 
2013 allegations appeared that large-scale bug-
ging of telephone connections in Germany was 
taking place. The largest controversies and firm 
reactions from German politicians were howev-
er caused by the information revealed in Octo-
ber about Chancellor Merkel’s telephone being 
tapped and the scope of co-operation between 
the German and American security services. 
The reactions of German politicians
The fact that German citizens were being spied 
upon by the US security services was revealed in 
the middle of the Bundestag election campaign. 
The opposition parties (the SPD, the Green 
Party and the Left Party) tried to make use of 
the scandal by discrediting the ruling Christian 
Democrats and Liberals. The liberal FDP sought 
to emphasise the necessity to protect personal 
data and civil liberties, which has traditionally 
been an important item on the party’s political 
agenda. The reaction of the Christian Democrats 
at both stages of the scandal proved to be the 
mildest. Nonetheless, even they toughened their 
stance when further information leaked regard-
ing the methods used by the American agency.  
Since the beginning of the scandal over the NSA 
operations in Germany, the federal government 
in Berlin claims that it did not know about the 
surveillance of German citizens by Americans, let 
alone about Chancellor Merkel’s telephone be-
ing tapped. While MPs from the FDP, in particu-
lar Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnar-
renberger, firmly demanded that the US clarify 
the issue and be held accountable for it, the 
Christian Democrats attempted to smooth it 
over. Chancellor Angela Merkel and Interior 
Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich called on the US 
to respect German law. Representatives of the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior and the German 
security services paid two visits to the US where 
they met with their American counterparts and 
negotiated an agreement on bringing to a halt 
intelligence operations carried out against each 
other. On the other hand, in Germany Friedrich 
emphasised the advantages of co-operation be-
tween the security services of the two countries. 
The reaction of the opposition was much more 
severe and has led to the establishment of an 
investigative committee in the Bundestag. Ron-
ald Pofalla, the head of the Federal Chancellery, 
who coordinates the work of the security servic-
es, was among those to be heard by this com-
mittee. The SPD and the Left Party criticised the 
federal government for its inept handling of the 
situation. During the election campaign for the 
Bundestag, the Social Democrats also demand-
ed that the work on the free trade agreement 
between the US and the EU be suspended. The 
opposition parties reproached the government 
for being slow to respond to the NSA scandal 
and for the disproportionate reaction to the 
revealed scale of the surveillance. Peter Schaar, 
the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection 
and Freedom of Information, also criticised the 
government for its passivity. 
After it was revealed that Chancellor Merkel’s 
telephone had been tapped the reactions from 
politicians began to converge. The government 
responded more critically than before – Foreign 
Minister Guido Westerwelle summoned the 
US ambassador to provide an explanation and 
Chancellor Merkel termed the NSA operations. 
The negotiations to sign the agreement about 
stopping intelligence operations against each 
other have also been intensified. It is, howev-
er, the opposition parties who have been at the 
forefront of the debate on the NSA’s activity. 
During the coalition negotiations the SPD held 
The revelation that Chancellor Angela 
Merkel’s telephone was tapped prompted 
a strong reaction from the German gov-
ernment. Negotiations on the agreement 
to end mutual intelligence operations 
have also been intensified.
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back from attacking the Christian Democrats but 
still called for the US to be held accountable. It 
is mainly due to the Social Democrats that the 
provision regarding the NSA activity was includ-
ed in the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition agreement2. 
The Left Party and the Greens are calling for the 
establishment of another investigative commit-
tee in the Bundestag, this time to deal with the 
fact that Merkel’s telephone had been tapped. 
As proposed by the opposition politicians, this 
committee would summon Edward Snowden 
among other people. The Green Party is the 
most active in this issue as data protection is be-
coming an increasingly important item on their 
political agenda. The party’s renowned poli-
tician Hans-Christian Stroebele even met with 
Snowden in Moscow in order to discuss the pos-
sibility of his appearing before the committee. 
The reactions of German society
German society, which is sensitive to the issue of 
data protection, has reacted to the information 
about the NSA surveillance in two ways. On the 
one hand, a survey commissioned by the public 
TV station ARD in July 2013 indicates that confi-
dence in the USA has substantially declined from 
65% to 49% – for the first time since Barack Oba-
ma became US president3. In November the num-
2 The potential coalition partners have committed them-
selves to clarifying the circumstances of NSA activity in 
Germany and to making efforts towards the signing an 
anti-espionage agreement.  
3 http://www.zeit.de/news/2013-07/05/d-umfrage-ver-
trauen-der-deutschen-zu-usa-leidet-unter-nsa-af-
faere-05001603
ber of Germans who believed that the US is a reli-
able partner for Germany stood at only 35%. The 
majority of Germans also declared themselves 
dissatisfied with the position of the federal gov-
ernment on the NSA scandal (over 70% of those 
surveyed). Part of the intellectuals and politicians 
whose political agendas are based on the concept 
of data protection (including the Green Party, the 
Pirate Party) is vehemently opposed to the surveil-
lance of Internet activity by foreign security ser-
vices. Seven German-speaking writers have also 
protested against it; as a group called “Writers 
Against Mass Surveillance” they have initiated 
a petition against these practices. On 10 Decem-
ber their manifesto was published by 30 Europe-
an daily newspapers. On the other hand, a major-
ity of Germans (76%) do not feel threatened by 
the NSA actions in Germany, and 44% believe that 
too much significance has been assigned to the 
surveillance by the American agency4. 
The legal context of the NSA activity 
in Germany
As the media reported and representatives of 
German ministries announced, the agreements 
regarding co-operation between the German 
and American security services which were in 
force at the time when the scandal broke out 
date back mainly to the 1960s. They include: 
an additional agreement to the North-Atlan-
tic Treaty regarding the deployment of military 
forces, signed in 1963; the law of 1968 relating 
to limiting the confidentiality of the post and tel-
ecommunications (under which the BND shares 
collected data with the military forces of the al-
lied countries which are deployed in Germany), 
and the administrative agreements of 1968. Un-
der these provisions the US intelligence services 
are entitled, as part of the protection of their 
citizens (initially, the troops deployed in bases 
in Germany) to use data gathered by the BND 
wiretapping and to independently run their own 
4 http://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/umfrage-zu-us-spi-
onage-deutsche-laesst-nsa-affaere-kalt-2068615.html
German society reacted to the revela-
tions about the surveillance in two ways. 
On the one hand, the survey indicates an 
important decline in confidence towards 
the US. On the other hand, the majority 
of Germans do not feel threatened by the 
NSA’s activity in Germany.
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data collection operations. Additionally, in 2002 
in the context of the war on terror being fought 
by the US, an agreement was signed about the 
establishment of a satellite tracking station (SIG-
NIT) whose tasks would include the protection 
of the troops on missions, also in Afghanistan. 
On 2 August 2013 the Federal Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Germany announced that it had termi-
nated the administrative agreement regarding 
the law on limiting the confidentiality of the post 
and telecommunications with the US and the UK 
by mutual consent, through the exchange of 
diplomatic notes. This does not spell the end of 
co-operation between the German and Amer-
ican intelligence services but merely the aban-
donment of a provision which was already a relic 
of a bygone age. The remaining legal acts which 
regulate co-operation between the German and 
American services have not been abrogated. 
The implications of the NSA scandal 
In the wake of the information that Chancellor 
Merkel’s telephone may have been tapped by the 
NSA and that other German citizens may have 
been eavesdropped, the government in Berlin 
is demanding that the present legal framework 
of intelligence co-operation between the two 
countries be changed. So far it has enabled close 
co-operation between Germany and the US but 
has not included a ban on mutual espionage. 
Germany at present is seeking to sign two new 
agreements with the US which would supersede 
the present regulations: an intergovernmental 
agreement and an agreement between the in-
telligence services of the two countries. They will 
regulate both co-operation between the servic-
es and limit the scope of operations of American 
intelligence agencies in Germany. In the inter-
governmental agreement of a political nature, 
Germany would like to include provisions which 
would rule out mutual surveillance, economic es-
pionage in bilateral relations, espionage with the 
use of operational techniques in Germany and 
the bugging of the heads of the two states. As 
was reported in Der Spiegel, Germany would like 
to ensure that certain provisions are included sim-
ilar to those in the Five Eyes agreements, that is, 
the agreements between the US, the UK, Canada, 
New Zealand and Australia signed in the second 
half of the 1940s with regard to intelligence shar-
ing and prohibiting mutual surveillance5. Merkel’s 
foreign policy advisor, Christoph Heusgen is re-
sponsible for negotiating the intergovernmental 
agreement for Germany, which proves that this 
document has been given top priority by Chan-
cellor Merkel. There are opinions in Germany that 
the EU’s largest countries should first conclude 
similar agreements between themselves since 
this would strengthen their negotiating posi-
tion in talks with the US. Officially, Germany has 
stressed the individual character of these agree-
ments from the outset. This may also mean that 
it wishes to emphasise the singularity of these 
German-American documents in the context of 
attempts to change the basis of relations be-
tween the two countries. Nevertheless, the US has 
ruled out negotiations of similar agreements with 
a larger number of parties. Already during the 
current talks Washington is opposed to setting 
a precedent with regard to the legal exclusion of 
wiretapping as it fears that similar demands will 
be made by other states6. This may mean that the 
5 Compare R. Neukirch, R. Pfister, L. Poitras, M. Rosen-
bach, J. Schindler, F. Schmid, H. Stark, Ohnmächtige 
Wut, Der Spiegel, no 45/2013, p. 31.
6 Compare D. E. Sanger, A. Smale, U.S.-Germany Intel-
ligence Partnership Falters Over Spying, NYT, http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/world/europe/us-ger-
many-intelligence-partnership-falters-over-spying.htm-
l?hp&_r=0 (access: 16.12.2013).
Germany is currently striving for two new 
agreements with the US to be signed 
which will replace the present regula-
tions: an intergovernmental agreement 
and an agreement between the security 
services of the two countries.
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German demands will not be met by signing the 
agreement with the US, which in practice would 
mean that the current US intelligence operations 
aimed at Germany will continue. 
From the German perspective the further co-op-
eration between the German and American 
intelligence services is necessary in order to 
guarantee security both for German citizens in 
Germany and for Bundeswehr troops involved 
in foreign missions (particularly in Afghanistan). 
This is mainly due to the US advantage in the 
field of cybersecurity. With regard to this, the 
German security services (above all the BND and 
the BfV) widely use intelligence gathered by the 
US7. The NSA scandal has further intensified the 
debate on the necessity to extend the cybernet-
ic competences of German intelligence and the 
defence capacities of counterintelligence to deal 
with cyber-attacks. This debate has also been 
part of the discussion over the reform of the BfV 
and the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (LfV) and co-operation between 
the services in the case of the NSU scandal (the 
three-person National Socialist Underground 
which murdered nine immigrants and a Ger-
man policewoman in 2000-2007; clarifying the 
circumstances of the murders and their extreme 
right-wing background was possible only after 
7 Interview with the head of the BfV, Hans-Georg 
Maaßen, Starke Spionageabwehr wichtig, http://www.
verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/inter-
views/int-20131126-wdr2  (access: 10.12.2013).
one member of the group denounced herself 
to the police in November 2011 and two other 
members committed suicide). 
There is traditional opposition in Germany to the 
security services being strengthened and to the 
concentration of their competences (one of the 
fundamental principles with regard to the work 
of these services prohibits the intelligence and the 
investigative competences – Trennungsgebot – 
being combined). The NSA scandal may thus serve 
as an argument to persuade public opinion that 
more competences are needed by the BND and 
the BfV to enable them to become more effective 
and less dependent on American intelligence. 
Extending the competences of the German ser-
vices will require increased funding for both sci-
entific research, technological development, and 
the development of the capacities of the services 
themselves, including personnel. Such measures 
are presented in the new coalition agreement 
between the CDU/CSU and the SPD; additional 
funding is mentioned in order to strengthen the 
Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and 
the Cyber-Defence Centre (Cyber-Abwehrzen-
trum) and other services in the area of cyber ca-
pacities. These are however long-term measures 
and in the short term Germany will be forced 
to use information from American intelligence 
agencies. Representatives of the German servic-
es admit that the detection of certain attempted 
attacks in Germany was possible exclusively due 
to intelligence obtained from foreign services 
(due to numerous connections this refers above 
all to American services) as in the cases of Sau-
erland-Gruppe and members of Deutsche Tali-
ban Mudschahidin8. Furthermore, Germany is 
interested in intelligence intercepted by the US 
8 Due to intelligence which the US services shared with 
German intelligence and counterintelligence, the Ger-
man police arrested those suspected of planning ter-
rorist attacks. Members of both groups, independent of 
each other, were being trained at the Afghan-Pakistani 
border and were planning attacks in Germany. The trial 
of the Sauerland-Gruppe members ended in 2010, while 
members of the Deutsche Taliban Mudschahidin re-
ceived sentences in the court in Berlin in 2013. Compare 
R. Neukirch, op. cit., p. 34. 
In the long term the revision of the pres-
ent principles of co-operation would result 
in the removal of one of the last relics of 
post-war relations between Germany and 
the US. Germany would thus enter a further 
– and perhaps the final – stage of emanci-
pating its foreign policy, which would see 
the creation of the basis of co-operation 
between the two partners. 
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from the regions of Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
North Africa and intelligence regarding organ-
ised crime and illegal immigration, which may 
help Germany’s internal security.
The conclusions
The current crisis of confidence in relations be-
tween Germany and the US is the most impor-
tant one since Germany expressed its opposition 
to the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 in the UN 
Security Council. The new agreements currently 
being negotiated are aimed at mutual non-sur-
veillance and are intended to ease the tension 
and to reassure public opinion in Germany which 
demands that Chancellor Merkel respond to this 
situation. At the same time they will not have 
an important influence on the present co-op-
eration between the intelligence services of the 
two countries due to its large scale and the com-
mon areas of collecting data which is used by 
both the US and Germany. America fears setting 
a precedent and is reluctant to limit its own 
competences. It will therefore not extend the 
intelligence alliance with Anglo-Saxon states 
(the Five Eyes agreement) to Germany and will 
probably not agree to a bilateral agreement with 
Germany to regulate new principles of co-opera-
tion between the intelligence services, including 
the ban on mutual espionage. In the long term 
a revision of the present principles of co-oper-
ation would result in the removal of one of the 
last relics of post-war relations between Germa-
ny and the US. Germany would thus enter a fur-
ther – and perhaps the final – stage of emanci-
pating its foreign policy following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, which would see the creation of the 
basis of co-operation between the two partners. 
Germany has used the information about the 
NSA operations to build a new foundation in its 
transatlantic relations. This foundation is aimed 
at reflecting Germany’s strong political and 
economic position as the EU’s most important 
state which is developing co-operation with 
the BRICS states and the new regional powers 
(Gestaltungsmächte). One of Berlin’s goals is to 
confirm its strong position in the international 
arena  and this may be seen in the country’s 
efforts to gain permanent membership on the 
UN Security Council. American opposition to 
Germany’s proposal regarding the provisions 
in the agreements means that the German part 
in the NSA scandal will not be closed and will 
impact both German-American relations and 
Germany’s internal relations (for example, the 
demands made by the opposition that Germa-
ny grant asylum to Snowden will resurface). De-
spite the visit of US Secretary of State John Ker-
ry, which has been scheduled for the beginning 
of this year (it had initially been thought that 
the agreements between Germany and the US 
would be signed during this visit) and Chancel-
lor Merkel’s confirmed visit to the US this year, 
a breakthrough in bilateral relations should not 
be expected. They will remain tense and full of 
mutual distrust.
